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Abstract 
The status of military courts within the South African judicial system is 
uncertain. This uncertainty makes it challenging to determine the acceptable degree 
of their independence, including determining the acceptable basic financial security 
of military judges. In Van Rooyen v The State (2002) 5 SA 246 (CC), the 
Constitutional Court accepted a lower standard of independence in relation to 
magistrates’ courts than it requires of the High Courts. It did this primarily because 
the Constitution provides for a hierarchy of courts and, in its view, this justifies the 
different degrees of independence of the various courts. This article will report on a 
systematic investigation into the status of military courts within the South African 
court hierarchy mainly in comparison with magistrates’ courts with the aim of 
making a recommendation on the appropriate level of remuneration for military 
judges. 
Introduction 
Basic financial security of judicial officers is one of the important 
requirements of judicial independence. In previous research, this author pointed out 
that the question of financial security of military judges is a complex one and 
requires special investigation. The uncertainty of the place of military courts within 
the South African court hierarchy and the uniqueness of these courts make it 
challenging to determine what constitutes adequate basic financial security for 
military judges and who should determine it. The key purpose of this article is to 
reflect on aspects of financial security of military judges. The article attempts to 
show that there is considerable room for 
improvement regarding financial security of 
military judges, and argues that overall, 
military judges are not adequately 
remunerated as required in terms of the 
principle of basic financial security, which 
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in turn raises questions about the judicial independence of military judges from an 
objective point of view. The article makes a recommendation, among others, on the 
appropriate level of remuneration for these judges with the view of improving the 
independence of military courts. It does this by reporting on a systematic 
investigation into the position of military courts within the South African court 
hierarchy, mainly in comparison with magistrates’ courts, and by considering some 
foreign trends and possible best practices in this field. The author further argues 
that military courts compare closely with magistrates’ courts. 
Application of judicial independence to military courts 
The question of application of the principle of judicial independence to 
military courts can be addressed at two levels, namely international law1 and 
domestic law, by considering whether the relevant legal frameworks apply to these 
courts. With regard to the former, it is particularly important because s 199(5) of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution) provides 
that “[t]he security services must act … in accordance with … customary 
international law and international agreements binding on the Republic”.2 
A number of international instruments binding on the Republic of South 
Africa require independent and impartial courts. Almost all of these instruments 
are in the field of human rights. They link judicial independence with the right to a 
fair trial. Thus, judicial independence is seen as a prerequisite for the enjoyment of 
the right to a fair trial. The starting point is the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR).3 Article 10 of the UDHR provides that “[e]veryone is entitled in 
full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, 
in the determination of his [her] rights and obligations and of any criminal charge 
against him [her]”.4 Similarly, Art 14(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
                                                 
1 This author addressed this question including some of the weaknesses of international law in 
this area in a doctoral thesis titled ‘Military Courts in a Democratic South Africa: In 




2 According to s 199(1) security services include the defence force. 
3 Adopted and proclaimed by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III) of 10 
December 1948. 
4 The UDHR was adopted as a declaratory instrument not meant to be binding. However, some 
scholars have argued that “[b]y virtue of its widespread acceptance, the Universal 
Declaration has gradually assumed an independent status as a statement of customary 
international law”: see Phillip, H ‘Human Rights and Economic Policy Discourse: 
Taking Economic and Social Rights Seriously’ (2002) 33 Columbia Law Review at 2. 
In the terms of the South African Constitution, s 232: “Customary international law is 
83 
Political Rights (ICCPR) provides that “[i]n the determination of any criminal 
charge against him [her], or of his [her] rights and obligations in a suit of law, 
everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent 
and impartial tribunal established by law”.5  
The UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), which monitors the 
implementation of the ICCPR, has stated that the right to be tried by an 
independent and impartial tribunal “is an absolute right that may suffer no 
exception”.6 Moreover, “[t]he provisions of article 14 apply to all courts and 
tribunals within the scope of that article whether ordinary or specialized”.7 It is 
therefore not difficult to conclude that military courts fall within the scope of the 
relevant articles by virtue of their wide jurisdiction because they have jurisdiction 
to try both military and criminal offences.8 
In addition, there are some important expectations from the field of 
humanitarian law with regard to the independence of military courts. The Geneva 
Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War explicitly requires 
military courts to be independent and impartial.9 This convention applies “to all 
cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two 
or more of the High Contracting Parties” and “to all cases of partial or total 
                                                                                                       
law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution”. It can hardly be 
argued that art 10 of the UDHR is inconsistent with the Constitution. South Africa is 
bound by those aspects of the UDHR that have attained the status of customary 
international law. 
5 Opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 May 1976). 
Another international instrument recognising the principle of judicial independence is 
the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of Their Families, opened for signature 18 December 1990, GA res 
45/158, Art 18 (entered into force 1 July 2003). 
6 UN Human Rights Committee, Communication No 263/1987, M. Gonzalez del Rio v Peru, 
UN Doc CCPR/C/46/D/263/1987 (1992), para 5.2. 
7 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 13 (Equality before the courts and the 
right to a fair and public hearing by an independent court established by law) Twenty-
first session (1984), para 4. 
8 See s 9(2) and 10(1)(a) of the Military Discipline Supplementary Measures Act 16 of 1999 
(Military Discipline Act). 
9 Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature 
12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135, Art 84 (entered into force 21 October 1950): This 
article requires prisoners of war to be tried in a military court that offers essential 
guarantees of independence and impartiality. It does not stipulate the nature of 
offences or trial as is the case with the UDHR and the ICCPR. South Africa has 
ratified this Convention. 
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occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party”,10 and can only be invoked 
if one is dealing with prisoners of war or victims of war.  
However, the fact that the Prisoners of War Convention specifically 
requires military courts to be independent in the above circumstances suggests that 
international humanitarian law generally expects military courts to be independent. 
If that is not how we should read the Convention, it will be difficult to expect 
countries to be able to comply with the provisions of Art 84 of the above-
mentioned Convention because it might be impractical or unrealistic, during an 
armed conflict, to expect a country, which generally operates non-independent 
military courts for its citizens, to set up independent military courts all of a sudden 
in order to satisfy the provisions of Art 84 in relation to prisoners of war or victims 
of war. 
Moving on to the African continent, Art 26 of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter)11 stipulates that the states parties 
“shall have the duty to guarantee the independence of the Courts”. The African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African Commission) has dealt 
with numerous complaints concerning military courts. According to this 
Commission, courts referred to in Art 26 include military courts. It has noted in a 
resolution that: 
[I]n many African countries military courts and special tribunals exist alongside 
regular judicial institutions. The purpose of military courts is to determine offences 
of a pure military nature committed by military personnel. While exercising this 
function, military courts are required to respect fair trial standards (emphasis 
added).12  
The result of all of these binding instruments is that South Africa has an 
international obligation to ensure that all courts are independent, including military 
courts. There is no discretion in this regard. Let us now turn to the domestic 
situation. 
Turning to domestic law, s 165(2) of the Constitution declares all courts to 
be independent. More importantly, section 165(4) of the same Constitution 
provides that “[o]rgans of state, through legislative and other measures, must assist 
                                                 
10 Art 2. 
11 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, opened for signature 27 June 1981, OAU 
Doc CAB/LEG/67/3 rev 5 (entered into force 21 October 1986). South Africa has 
ratified the African Charter. 
12 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Dakar Declaration and 
Recommendations Twenty-sixth Session (1999), para 3 in Heyns, C (ed) Human 
Rights in Africa: Vol 1 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2004) at 586. 
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and protect the courts to ensure the independence, impartiality, dignity, 
accessibility and effectiveness of the courts”. Again, no discretion has been granted 
to the state as far as judicial independence of the courts is concerned because the 
language used in this provision is peremptory and there is nothing to suggest that 
military courts are excluded from the envisaged assistance and protection by the 
state to ensure their independence. 
The place of military courts within the South African judicial system  
It is important to highlight briefly the place of military courts within the 
South African judicial system in order to clarify the status of these courts within 
the system and to demonstrate further that judicial independence applies to military 
courts. Previous research has shown that military courts are part of the South 
African judicial system as a matter of domestic law.13 Section 166 of the 
Constitution establishes four types of courts. These are – 
(a) “the Constitutional Court;  
(b) the Supreme Court of Appeal;  
(c) the High Courts, including any high court of appeal that may be 
established by an Act of Parliament to hear appeals from High Courts;  
(d) the Magistrates’ Courts...”  
Furthermore, s166(e) also speaks of “any other court established or 
recognised in terms of an Act of Parliament, including any court of a status similar 
to either the High Courts or the Magistrates’ Courts”. The table below illustrates 
the different levels of various courts in order of superiority. 
Table A: Levels of courts 
The Constitutional Court 
The Supreme Court Appeal 
The High Courts or courts of similar status 
Regional Magistrates’ Courts14 
Magistrates’ Courts or courts of similar status 
The Constitutional Court is the highest court of the Republic of South 
Africa.15 It may decide constitutional matters and issues connected with decisions 
on constitutional matters and any matter, which raises an arguable point of law of 
                                                 
13 See Tshivhase, AE ‘Transformation of military courts’ (2009) 24 SAPR/PL 450 at 463–5. 
14 These are not mentioned in s 166 of the Constitution. They were created in terms of the 
Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944. 
15 S 167(3)(a) of the Constitution, 1996. 
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public importance, which ought to be considered by that court.16 On the other hand, 
the Supreme Court of Appeal may decide only on appeals and issues connected 
with appeals from the High Courts or courts of similar status, except labour or 
competition matters.17 
Section 166(e) envisages a fifth type of court. The courts referred to in s 
166 can be divided into two levels – high courts and lower courts. It is not easy to 
determine where each of the military courts illustrated below falls within the 
hierarchy of South African courts given the uniqueness and hierarchical nature of 
military courts.  
Table B: Hierarchy of military courts 
The Court of Military Appeals 
The Court of Senior Military Judge 
The Court of Military Judge 
Commanding Officers’ Disciplinary Hearing18 
An attempt to determine where each of the above courts falls within the 
hierarchy of the South African judicial system is crucial when determining suitable 
measures for structuring the judicial independence of military courts including 
financial security of military judges because such measures should be informed 
partially by the status of a particular court and its functions. This is in line with the 
approach of the Constitutional Court in Van Rooyen v The State19 where the Court 
accepted a lower standard of independence in relation to magistrates’ courts than it 
requires of the High Courts, especially on institutional aspects in relation to the 
independence of the Magistrates’ Commission. The Court did this for several 
reasons, including the fact that the Constitution provides for a hierarchy of courts 
and in its view, this justifies the different degrees of independence. This means that 
the measures that should be adopted to safeguard judicial independence of military 
courts should be with reference to their status within the courts’ hierarchy and their 
functions. 
The determination in this article will focus on the Court of Senior Military 
Judge (CSMJ) and the Court of Military Judge (CMJ), which can be referred to as 
                                                 
16 S 167(3)(b)(i) and (ii) ibid. 
17 S 168(3)(a) and (b) ibid. 
18 This forum will not be included in the discussion because its status as a court of law is 
seriously questionable and requires a separate consideration. For a consideration of the 
status of this forum generally and its possible future, see Tshivhase, AE ‘The future of 
military summary trials in the modern age’ in Duxbury, A & Groves, M (eds) Military 
Justice in the Modern Age (Cambridge 2016) at 347. 
19 (2002) 5 SA 246 (CC). 
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‘lower military courts’. The analysis will be court-specific.20 The Court of Military 
Appeals will not be included in the determination because its arrangements warrant 
a separate discussion. Comparing military courts with courts of similar status 
within the hierarchy of South African courts may help shed some light on the 
actual status of these courts. Furthermore, military courts are compared with 
magistrates’ courts because the overall judicial scheme provided for in the 
Constitution points in this direction.21  
Comparing lower military courts with magistrates’ courts 
The jurisdiction of lower military courts suggests that magistrates’ courts 
provide a suitable basis of comparison for purposes of determining the appropriate 
measures to ensure financial security of military judges. In this section, the CMJ is 
compared with district magistrates’ courts while the CSMJ is compared with 
regional magistrates’ courts. However, the Constitution does not draw a distinction 
between magistrates’ courts and regional magistrates’ courts – such distinction is a 
creature of statute. As far as judicial independence is concerned, the distinction 
between the two courts only affects one element – financial security of the 
respective judicial officers. Regional magistrates naturally earn more than district 
magistrates.22 For purposes of this article, the distinction may prove to be helpful in 
determining appropriate remuneration for both military judges and senior military 
judges.  
Table C shows how the CMJs compare with district magistrates’ courts in 
terms of jurisdiction in respect of persons, offences and sentencing powers. The 
first row shows that the expectations with regard to the qualifications of both 
military judges and district magistrates are almost on a par. The key requirement 
that separates the two is that military judges must also be qualified military law 
officers. This entails successful completion of three military courses: basic military 
training, officers’ formative course, and advanced military law course. Taken 
together, these courses take almost a year to complete depending on the arm of 
service to which a particular military judge belongs. The second row of the table 
                                                 
20 The Court of a Senior Military Judge is not necessarily a higher court in the greater scheme 
of things because it has no appellate powers. 
21 Both military and magistrates’ courts have jurisdiction to try criminal offences in general. 
22 See Proclamation 327 of 17 March 2016 made in terms of the Magistrates’ Act 90 of 1993 
for salaries of different grades of magistrates at the time of writing. 
88 
suggests that magistrates’ courts deal with more people than the CMJ. South 
Africa’s total population is estimated at 56,52 million.23 












Has to be a fit and proper 
person; legally qualified; 
successful completion of 
an applicable course; 
must have acted as a 
judicial officer for a 
substantive period of six 
months24 
Should have a degree in law, 
military law course, rank of major 
or equivalent, be a fit and proper 
person of sound character, three 
years’ experience as a practising 
advocate or attorney or three 
years’ experience in the 
administration of criminal or 
military justice 
Jurisdiction in 




All persons within the 
area of court’s 
jurisdiction in the 
Republic of South Africa 
Only persons subject to the 
military discipline code (but only 
up to the rank of major or 
equivalent) within or beyond 
South African borders 
Jurisdiction in 
respect of offences 
All offences25 except 
treason, murder, rape and 
compelled rape 
All offences (both military and 
civilian) except murder, treason, 
rape, culpable homicide, or any 
offence under ss 4 and 5 of the 
Military Discipline Code (MDC)26 
Limits in respect of 
a sentence of 
imprisonment 
Imprisonment for a 
period not exceeding 
three years  
Maximum is two years  
Limits in respect of 
a fine 





                                                 
23 Statistics South Africa Mid-year Population Estimates (July 2017), available at 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0302/P03022017.pdf. 
24 These requirements are in terms of s 10 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944 and 
General Regulations (GNR. 361 of 11 March 1994) enacted in terms of the 
Magistrates Act 90 of 1993 (Regulation 3). 
25 Both civilian and military offences, but nothing much should be read into this because 
civilian courts can try military offences only on paper, as they do not do so in practice. 
26 Offences endangering the safety of forces and offences in relation to conduct in action. 
These two offences carry sentences of 30 and 10 years, respectively. 
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This should be contrasted with the total size of the strength of the South 
African National Defence Force (SANDF) with a reported membership of 66 821 
for the period 2015–2016.27 The second row shows that magistrates’ courts try 
more offences than CMJs. The offence that separates the two is culpable homicide. 
Magistrates’ courts can try this offence while the CMJ cannot. Similarly, the fourth 
row shows that magistrates’ courts have more sentencing powers in respect of 
imprisonment than those possessed by a CMJ. Finally, the fifth row suggests that 
magistrates’ courts can impose a far more severe fine than the CMJ.28  
There is no doubt that magistrates’ courts have more powers than the CMJ. 
However, the CMJ is unique in three senses. First, it tries both military and civilian 
offences as a matter of law and practice. Second, it has extra-territorial jurisdiction. 
Third, it may at times be required to operate in a war or warlike environment, such 
as peace support operations. These aspects present a mixed picture of how 
magistrates’ courts compare with the CMJ for purposes of determining the level of 
protection, which should be afforded the CMJ to ensure its independence. 
Nonetheless, the CMJ compares very closely with magistrates’ courts.  
Let us now consider the position of the CSMJ in relation to that of regional 
magistrates’ courts. The table below illustrates how the two compare. The first row 
shows that military legislation is much clearer compared to legislation governing 
magistrates regarding the requirements for appointment of military judges. 
However, most of the requirements in the CSMJ column are considerations in the 
appointment of regional magistrates, i.e. experience in the administration of justice. 
There are two unique requirements for appointment as a senior military judge. One 
is that a candidate must also be a qualified military officer, which requires 
completion of certain military courses as already explained in respect of ordinary 
military judges. The other is that one must be a qualified military legal practitioner 
by virtue of having passed a departmental course in military law. This suggests that 
more is expected of senior military judges compared to regional magistrates in 
                                                 
27 Department of Defence, Annual Report (2015/16) 
http://www.dod.mil.za/documents/annualreports/Annual%20Report%202016%20RG
B%20Final%20to%20DoDsmall.pdf at 122] 
28 However, this does not represent the total picture because the maximum fine of R6 000, 
which may be imposed by the CMJ, is subject to a maximum penalty imposed by law 
for a particular offence and its own penal jurisdiction. It means that there could be 
instances where the CMJ would be empowered to impose a fine over R6 000, 
provided the offence in question requires such and the maximum imprisonment for 
that offence does not exceed the penal jurisdiction of a CMJ. For example, if a 
particular offence provides for a period of imprisonment not exceeding three years 
with an alternative of imposing a fine not exceeding R7 000, the CMJ would not have 
jurisdiction to try the offence in question because the maximum period of 
imprisonment for that offence exceeds its penal jurisdiction. 
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terms of qualifications and this must be viewed in the context within which 
military judges function. 
Table D: Comparison between the CSMJ and regional magistrates’ courts 
 REGIONAL 
MAGISTRATES’ COURTS 








Magistrate or LLB or a pass 
in the Public Service Senior 
Law Examination or 
equivalent or superior and 
recommended as suitable for 
appointment by the 
Magistrate’ s Commission 
Degree in law, military law course, 
rank of colonel or equivalent, be a 
fit and proper person of sound 
character, five years’ experience as 
a practising advocate or attorney or 
five years’ experience in the 
administration of criminal or 
military justice  
Jurisdiction 





All persons within the area of 
court’s jurisdiction in the 
Republic of South Africa 
Any person subject to the MDC 
Jurisdiction 
in respect of 
offences 
All offences except treason Any offence other than murder, 
treason, rape or compelled rape 
and culpable homicide committed 
within the Republic of South 
Africa 
Limits in 
respect of a 
sentence of 
imprisonment 
No limit  No limit 
Limits in 
respect of a 
fine 
Maximum of R300 000 Maximum of R6 000 but subject to 
the maximum fine provided by law 







As was the case in Table C, the second row shows that regional 
magistrates’ courts in all likelihood try more people than the CSMJ because the 
civilian population will usually be far greater than persons subject to the MDC in 
any given area. The same logic applies in respect of the third row, namely that 
regional magistrates’ courts try more serious offences than the CSMJ. The CSMJ 
only has a chance to try more offences when such offences have been committed 
beyond the borders of the Republic of South Africa. It is common cause that this 
rarely happens because it largely depends on the extent to which members of the 
defence force are deployed outside the borders of South Africa. 
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The fourth row shows that regional magistrates’ courts and the CSMJ have 
the same sentencing powers with respect to imprisonment. However, this is slightly 
misleading because the extensive powers of the CSMJ with respect to 
imprisonment are rarely exercised. The reason for this is that the CSMJ does not 
have jurisdiction to try most serious offences29 (committed within the Republic of 
South Africa) that would attract a sentence of severe imprisonment. This means 
that despite the enormous powers of the CSMJ to hand down severe sentences, 
which may include life imprisonment, in practice, regional magistrates’ courts still 
hand down more severe sentences of imprisonment than the CSMJ. Nevertheless, 
the fact that the extensive sentencing powers of the CSMJ are infrequently 
exercised does not necessarily mean that such powers must be downplayed when 
considering the status that should be accorded to the CSMJ. The infrequency does 
not change the fact that the court possesses such powers. On the whole, the 
comparison between regional magistrates’ courts and the CSMJ also presents a 
mixed picture. Regional magistrates’ courts are stronger in some aspects while the 
CSMJ is in other aspects. Ultimately, the two could be regarded on a par. 
In Canada, a special committee was appointed to consider the 
compensation of military judges.30 One of the crucial issues the committee had to 
deal with was to determine “the appropriate level of Military Judges’ compensation 
taking into account the nature of their role and the tasks they undertake”.31 The 
committee compared the role of military judges to that of other judicial officers in 
Canada and recommended that Provincial Court judges across Canada provide an 
appropriate basis of comparison for purposes of determining the appropriate level 
of compensation.32 Provincial Court judges are largely the equivalent of 
magistrates in South Africa. By way of analogy, the outcome of the Canadian study 
may serve to indicate that comparing military courts with magistrates’ courts is 
generally appropriate.33  
                                                 
29 These are murder, culpable homicide, rape and compelled rape. All these offences are 
generally common within the Republic of South Africa. 
30 Department of National Defence ‘Report on the Compensation of Military Judges’ (2004), 
available at www.forces.gc.ca/site/reports/mjcc04/index_e.asp. 
31 Ibid. 
32 It is important to note that another member of the Committee, L’Heureux-Dube J, disagreed 
with the majority and took the view that military judges should be granted a status 
equivalent to that of Canadian Superior Court judges. 
33 For some related developments in Canada, see Department of National Defence, ‘Report on 
the Compensation of Military Judges’ (2008), available at 
www.forces.gc.ca/site/reports-rapports/mjcc08/index-eng.asp . This report builds on 
the studies carried out in the preceding years. It makes recommendations on the 
remuneration of military judges, taking into account a number of new factors that 
arose since the previous studies. These are dealt with below. 
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Canada stands out as a country that has probably done the most studies in 
the area of trying to understand the place of military courts within the hierarchy of 
a judicial system. In addition, it is also an important jurisdiction to consider for the 
following reasons:  
 It is on the cutting edge of reform of military justice in the world;  
 The current system of military justice in South Africa was modelled on 
the Canadian system as it existed then (i.e. in 1999); and  
 Canadian jurisprudence has been very influential in shaping South 
Africa’s Constitutional Court jurisprudence in the field of judicial 
independence as seen in the judgment such as De Lange v Smuts.34  
It is therefore appropriate to consider Canada for comparative purposes in 
this area. However, Canada is not the only country worth considering. Some of the 
countries that have also been on the cutting edge of reform of military courts 
considered in this article are Australia, India, the United Kingdom (UK) and New 
Zealand.35 Lessons can be drawn from these jurisdictions as well. Moreover, armed 
forces in most democracies share common features and concerns, and do learn 
from each other in various fields. There may be other jurisdictions worth 
considering over and above these in this field but the scope of this article did not 
permit such an investigation. However, this does not mean the solution to the 
problems faced has to be the same across all jurisdictions. It is a matter of drawing 
lessons from other jurisdictions that have dealt with similar challenges in this fast 
developing area of law in some jurisdictions. In considering these countries, the 
intention of the study on which this article reports was not to make a 
comprehensive comparative study of South Africa and the countries considered but 
rather to establish possible trends in some areas and also to refer to what this author 
regards as some of the best practices from these jurisdictions on the subject of 
financial security of military judges.  
Addressing aspects of financial security of military judges 
 This section addresses the financial security of military judges through a 
series of questions. These are: Who should determine the remuneration of military 
                                                 
34 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC). 
35 In New Zealand, military judges are civilians. However, this author does not attach 
significance to this in relation to financial security, as all judicial officers should enjoy 
basic financial security regardless of the court in which they function. Whether or not 
military judges should be civilians is a different topic and one which this author has 
commented on in previous research. 
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judges? Which factors should guide the remuneration of military judges? What is 
the appropriate level of remuneration of military judges? 
Who should determine the remuneration of military judges?  
In the current setup, military judges are public servants.36 Prior to 2004, the 
salaries of soldiers, including military judges, were determined in accordance with 
the Public Service Act, No 103 of 1994. This situation has been altered by the 
Defence Act of 2002.37 Salaries of military personnel are now determined by the 
Military Bargaining Council (MBC), failing which, by the Minister of Defence 
taking into account recommendations of the recently established Defence Force 
Commission but with the approval of the Minister of Finance.38 In the recent past, 
the MBC has failed to resolve many of the disputes between the SANDF and the 
military trade unions concerning transformation and conditions of service of 
soldiers. Some of the matters ended in the Constitutional Court, and soldiers have 
engaged in industrial action.39 
Although the extent to which the above scenario has affected military 
judges is unclear, it is inconsistent with judicial independence for military judges to 
be caught up in the situation described above.40 The remuneration arrangement 
described above is not suitable for judicial officers. It ignores the status of military 
judges as judicial officers and this is inconsistent with the United Nations Basic 
Principles on the Independence of Judiciary (UN Principles),41 which require that 
                                                 
36 See Public Service Act, 1994 (Proclamation No 103 of 1994), s 8 read with the definition of 
‘employee’ in s 1 of the Act and also s 5(b) of the Defence Act 42 of 2002 which 
place the Department of Defence within the public service. 
37 Defence Act 42 of 2002 (Defence Act). However, the SANDF is still part of the public 
service although the conditions of service of military personnel are now extensively 
regulated by the new Defence Act. 
38 Defence Act, s 55. The Defence Force Commission deals with conditions of service of all 
military personnel. 
39 See SANDU v Minister of Defence and Others 2007 (5) SA 400 for an account of some of 
the events on this issue.  
40 See Van Rooyen v The State (n 19) para 139 for remarks that support this view. 
41 Adopted by the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention and the Treatment of 
Offenders held in Milan from 26 August to 6 September 1985 and endorsed by GA 
Res 40/32 and 40/146 of 13 December 1985. These principles have been cited with 
approval by the Constitutional Court in a number of judgements, including in the 
Justice Alliance of South Africa v President of the Republic of South Africa & others 
2011 (5) SA 388 (CC) para 38. According to the Preamble of the Principles, they are 
formulated to assist member states in their task of securing and promoting the 
independence of the judiciary and “should be taken into account and respected by the 
Governments within the framework of their national legislation and practice…”. The 
African Commission has referred to these principles on numerous occasions to justify 
their conclusions on the violation of the right to fair trial in the African Charter. 
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the law should secure adequate remuneration and conditions of service for judicial 
officers.42 Section 165 of the Constitution read with the UN Principles on Judicial 
Independence presupposes the adoption of special measures, which ensure basic 
financial security for judicial officers. In Van Rooyen v The State, the 
Constitutional Court held that salaries of magistrates must be determined in 
accordance with s 165 of the Constitution and that the power to determine such 
salaries is subject to constitutional control.43 There is no justification why this 
should be different for military judges. 
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court has stated that judicial independence 
is a principle and a norm that went beyond and lay outside of the Bill of Rights and 
therefore is not subject to the limitation clause.44 This means that non-compliance 
with the basic conditions of judicial independence cannot be justified. Measures 
must be adopted to address financial security of military judges in such a way that 
their financial packages are appropriately determined and adequate.  
The compensation of magistrates and civilian judges is maintained by an 
independent structure – the Independent Commission for the Remuneration of 
Public Office Bearers45 established in terms of s 219 of the Constitution and the 
Independent Commission for the Remuneration of Public Office Bearers Act.46 
Although s 219 does not mention magistrates as public office bearers, s 1 of the 
legislation establishing the Commission includes magistrates in the definition of 
public office bearers.47 Let us look at how some countries on the cutting edge of 
development of military justice have dealt with the question of remuneration of 
their military judges. 
In Australia, the remuneration of military judges used to be set by the 
Commonwealth Remuneration Tribunal when the new system was still up and 
running.48 In the proposed system, the position has not changed.49 That move 
                                                                                                       
Another declaratory document adopted recently is the Bangalore Principles of Judicial 
Conduct. It was adopted by the Judicial Group on Strengthening Judicial Integrity in 
November 2002. The author should also point out that, apart from these two, there are 
numerous documents on judicial independence (for a brief indication, see The Judicial 
Institution in Southern Africa (Siber Ink 2006) at 1–13. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Van Rooyen v The State op cit para 148. 
44 Ibid para 35. 
45 The Commission consists of seven members appointed by the President in terms of s 3 of the 
Act. At the time of writing, the chairperson of the Commission was Judge CJ Musi. 
46 92 of 1997. 
47 The original version of the Act did not include magistrates as public office bearers, but was 
later amended to include them. 
48 That is the same structure that determines remuneration for justices in Chapter III courts in 
that country. 
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amounted to integration of military judges into the mainstream on the question of 
remuneration. Salaries and allowances of judge advocates in the United Kingdom 
are determined by the Lord Chancellor50 with the approval of the Treasury.51 In 
Canada, the remuneration of military judges is regularly reviewed by a 
Compensation Committee.52 New Zealand has passed legislation, which requires 
the salaries of military judges to be paid out of public money at a rate determined 
by the Remuneration Authority.53 The same institution determines salaries of other 
judges in New Zealand. This, too, is an integration of military judges into the 
mainstream regarding their remuneration. On the issue of reduction of salaries, of 
the five countries examined, New Zealand and India are the only countries with 
legislative provisions which specifically bar the reduction of salaries of military 
judges.54  
The above survey shows an emerging trend to establish special measures to 
deal with financial security of military judges, a move which augurs well for 
judicial independence of these judges. Military judges are increasingly receiving 
special attention. The majority of countries surveyed seemed to favour integrating 
military judges into existing mainstream structures with respect to the 
determination of their salaries. Of all the countries considered, Canada was the 
only country with a structure created specifically to look into the compensation of 
military judges. 
As already indicated, the law envisages special measures regarding the 
remuneration of all judicial officers. In my view, there are three possible options 
that could be followed on who should determine the remuneration of military 
judges. 
The first option could be to integrate military judges into mainstream 
civilian structures on the issue of remuneration. They could be included in the 
work of the Independent Commission for the Remuneration of Public Office 
Bearers. This would obviously require amending the definition of a public office 
bearer in s 3 of the Independent Commission for the Remuneration of Public Office 
Bearers Act to include military judges as was done in the case of magistrates. 
Military judges are judicial officers, There should therefore not be any legal 
                                                                                                       
49 See s 20 of the Military Court of Australia Bill. 
50 The Lord Chancellor is a senior functionary in Great Britain responsible for the efficient 
functioning and independence of the courts. 
51 S 33 of Courts-Martial (Appeals) Act 1951. 
52 S 165.22(2) of the National Defence Act 1985. 
53 Established in terms of the Remuneration Authority Act 1977. 
54 See s 20(3) of the Court Martial Act 2007 and s 10 of The Armed Forces Tribunal Act 2007, 
respectively. 
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difficulty in accepting them as public office bearers. Integrating military judges 
into mainstream civilian structures is supported by foreign trends in the area of 
compensation of military judges as seen in Australia and New Zealand. Over the 
years, the Commission on the Remuneration of Public Office Bearers has 
developed expertise in determining salaries of judicial officers. This move might 
help in lifting the status of military judges and the strengthening of their financial 
security. However, a possible difficulty with this option is that military judges and 
their work are hardly known in civilian settings due to the historical separate 
existence of the military justice system. The Commission will need to study the 
role of military judges and their unique situation in order to come up with 
appropriate recommendations with respect to their compensation. This is not an 
impossible task although it may initially require a considerable effort. It is hoped 
that the work done and reported in this article could assist in that process. 
The second option could be the Defence Force Service Commission.55 The 
role of the Commission is to make recommendations to the Minister of Defence 
and Military Veterans concerning the salaries, service benefits and other conditions 
of service of members of the Defence Force annually. The Commission is 
empowered to conduct research on the conditions of service and to consider any 
representations made to it.  
Ordinarily, the Commission looks into the salaries of military law officers, 
and by extension military judges, but it is unlikely to address the issues concerning 
military judges if it looks at them as mere military law officers instead of viewing 
them as judicial officers. Nevertheless, there are two concerns which suggest that 
the Commission may not be a suitable vehicle to deal with the financial security of 
military judges. The first is that the Commission would, in all likelihood, be 
overwhelmed in its work given the size of the Defence Force and the diverse 
interests of its members. It can be expected that the financial security of military 
judges would be over-shadowed by many other competing interests. The second 
concern is the independence of the Commission and the force of its 
recommendations. The Commission consists of no fewer than eight members all of 
whom are appointed by the Minister of Defence. Its recommendations must be 
approved by the Minister of Defence acting in consultation with the Minister of 
Finance, and agreed upon in the MBC.56 If no agreement can be reached in the 
MBC, the Minister “may, after consideration of any advisory report by the Military 
Arbitration Board and with the approval of the Minister of Finance, determine the 
                                                 
55 Established through the Defence Amendment Act 22 of 2010, amending s 55 of the Defence 
Act 2002. 
56 S 5(1) of the Defence Amendment Act 2010. 
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pay, salaries and entitlements …” of members of the Defence Force.57 The 
inappropriateness of the MBC as a vehicle to determine salaries of military judges 
has already been pointed out and will not be repeated here. Furthermore, it is clear 
that the force of the recommendations of the Commission is weak, as it is entirely 
dependent on the take of the Minister of Defence in the first place, and the Minister 
of Finance in the second place. 
The third and probably the most viable option to determine the 
remuneration of military judges could be the creation of an independent structure, 
which could be styled as the Military Judicial Commission.58 This option is also 
supported by foreign precedents as shown in the context of Canada above. The 
Commission could be modelled on the South African Magistrates’ Commission.59 
It would be more useful if the Commission is also empowered, by law, to conduct 
research on the working conditions of military judges and to make policy 
recommendations. Most importantly, the annual recommendations of the 
Commission concerning the remuneration of military judges should be submitted 
to Parliament for approval, not to the Minister of Defence, as this may mean that 
military judges would be at the mercy of the Executive regarding their 
remuneration. The implication is that military judges would have to be paid from 
monies appropriated by Parliament instead of the coffers of the Department of 
Defence.60 The Military Judicial Commission could serve as a filter between the 
military judiciary and the SANDF or Parliament with regard to remuneration of 
military judges and that would enhance the independence and dignity of military 
courts.61 It is possible to structure such a body in a way that it would not cost much 
to the state.  
                                                 
57 S 55(3) of the Defence Act. 
58 See also Tshivhase, AE ‘Institutionalising a Military Judicial Office and Improving Security 
of Tenure of Military Judges in South Africa’ Law, Democracy & Development 
(2015) 19 (79) at 92, where this author supports this idea in the context of 
appointment of military judges. 
59 See Tshivhase (n 13 above). In this connection, the Magistrates’ Act, 90 of 1993 s 12(1)(a) 
allows the Minister of Justice to determine salaries in consultation with the 
Commission. The relationship between this and recommendations made by the 
Commission for Public Office Bearers is not entirely clear. 
60 Similarly, the recommendations of the Independent Commission on the Remuneration of 
Public Office Bearers must be submitted to Parliament before their publication in the 
Government Gazette (see s 8(5) of the relevant Act). This is in line with the UN 
Principles, which require that the law should secure adequate remuneration of judicial 
officers. This presupposes the involvement of the legislature in setting the salaries of 
judicial officers. 
61 Tshivhase (n 13 above) at 473. By way of emphasis, in Reference re: Public Sector Pay 
Reduction Act (PEI), Attorney General of  Canada et al, Interveners; Reference re: 
Independence of Judges of Provincial Court, Prince Edward Island, Provincial Court 
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Finally, encouragement to carry out the above suggestions should be drawn 
from the fact that military judges are judicial officers and therefore public office 
bearers. Their uniqueness should not overshadow their actual status. 
Which factors should guide the remuneration of military judges? 
Section 165 of the Constitution does not explain how to determine 
appropriate levels of remuneration of judicial officers. The Constitutional Court 
has acknowledged this to be a difficult area for which there are no easy answers.62 
What is known is that the remuneration must be adequate, and the UN Principles 
require that the law should secure adequate remuneration of judicial officers. It is 
also known that there is currently no military judicial salary, in other words, 
military judges are not recognised as judicial officers for purposes of remuneration. 
The Independent Commission for the Remuneration of Public Office 
Bearers is required to take the following factors into account when determining 
appropriate salary levels for different office bearers including judicial officers:  
When making recommendations …the Commission must take the following factors into 
account:  
i. The role, status, duties, functions and responsibilities of the office bearers 
concerned;  
ii. The affordability of different levels of remuneration of public office bearers;  
iii. Current principles and levels of remuneration, particularly in respect of 
organs of state, and in society generally;  
iv. Inflationary increases;  
v. The available resources of the state; and  
vi. Any other factor which, in the opinion of the said Commission, is relevant.63  
                                                                                                       
Act and Public Sector Pay Reduction Act; Attorney General of Canada et al, 
Interveners (1997) 150 DLR (4th) 577 the Canadian Supreme Court held that 
“independent commissions were required to improve the process designed to ensure 
judicial independence but that the commissions’ recommendations need not be 
binding. These commissions were intended to remove the amount of judges’ 
remuneration from the political sphere and to avoid confrontation between 
governments and the judiciary...”. However, it must be noted that in In re: 
Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 744 
(CC), paras 59 and 124, it was held that there is no obligation to establish independent 
structures to serve as a filter between the judiciary and the executive, and that this is a 
matter of political choice, not mandatory for securing judicial independence. On the 
other hand, the Constitutional Court recognises that such structures play a crucial role 
in the determination of salaries and conditions of service for judicial officers: Van 
Rooyen v The State op cit paras 145–148. 
62 Van Rooyen v The State op cit para 138. 
63 S 8(6) of the Independent Commission for the Remuneration of Public Office-bearers Act 92 
of 1997. 
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The above factors are quite interesting because they are comprehensive, 
capable of flexible application to various office bearers, and would in all likelihood 
ensure that salaries of judicial officers are adequate if applied reasonably. Factor i 
is the crucial missing link with regard to the remuneration of military judges, as 
their role, status, duties, functions and responsibilities as judicial officers are 
currently not taken into account. Factors ii–v are generic, and are usually 
considered in the ordinary course of events. 
Switching to comparative analysis on the issue, Canada has evolved to 
become a model in structuring the remuneration of military judges. As already 
pointed out, Canada has established a special and independent committee whose 
purpose is to enquire into the adequacy of the remuneration of military judges as 
suggested already.64 The committee has conducted studies and compiled reports on 
the issue. In its enquiries, the committee must be guided by the following factors: 
a. The prevailing economic conditions in Canada, including the cost of 
living and the overall economic and current financial position of the 
federal government; 
b. The role of financial security of military judges in ensuring judicial 
independence; 
c. The need to attract outstanding officers as military judges; and 
d. Any other objective criteria that the Commission considers relevant.65 
Each of these factors is discussed by the Military Judges Compensation 
Committee in its 2008 Report. Countries that are keen to improve and understand 
the financial security of military judges could find the work being carried out in 
Canada to be instructive. Factor b is very important because it goes to the heart of 
the issue. The role of the committee is to determine an appropriate level of 
remuneration of military judges based on the above factors.66 Its aim is neither to 
determine the minimum remuneration nor to achieve maximal conditions.67 Having 
assessed the factors provided for in the Remuneration of Public Office Bearers Act 
and the Canadian approach to the matter, it is proposed that the appropriate 
remuneration of South African military judges should be guided by the following 
six factors: 
                                                 
64 The Military Judges Compensation Committee. 
65 See Department of National Defence, Report of the Military Judges Compensation 
Committee (2008) www.forces.gc.ca/site/reports-rapports/mjcc08/index-eng.asp. 
66 See ibid at 6–7. For the workings of the Committee, see art. 204.23 to 204.27 of the Queens 
Regulations and Orders. 
67 See ibid. 
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 the role, status, duties, functions and responsibilities of military judges 
including their  unique circumstances;68 
 the status of military courts within the South African judicial system; 
 the role of financial security of military judges in ensuring judicial 
independence; 
 the available resources of the state taking into account the prevailing 
economic conditions; 
 inflation; and 
 the need to attract outstanding officers as military judges. 
These factors could go a long way in determining an appropriate level of 
remuneration of military judges. 
What is the appropriate level of remuneration of military judges? 
It is probably ambitious to attempt to answer this question within the scope 
of this article. Bearing that difficulty in mind, what follows is an attempt to answer 
the question in a principled and tentative way, without necessarily considering all 
the pragmatic aspects of the question but primarily being guided by the factors 
proposed above. 
It has already been established that, unlike in the case of High Court judges 
and magistrates, there is no special dispensation for determining salaries and 
benefits for military judges. As will be discussed further below, these judges are 
not adequately remunerated except those who have been in service for a very long 
time who receive better remuneration on that basis and consistent ‘good’ 
performance. This can be discerned from the Occupation Specific Dispensation for 
Military Law Practitioners (OSD MLP) adopted in 2009 and the Personnel 
Management Code (PMC) adopted in 2010.69  
According to the OSD MLP, the PMC and salary grades for the 2016 
financial year, a military judge with legal experience of between three (minimum 
required) and ten years’ experience earned between R266 19370 (ML-2) and 
R434 142 (ML-3) per annum depending on the exact number of years of service 
                                                 
68 The assessment of this factor should also include the fact that military judges are required to 
travel extensively, sometimes even beyond the borders of the Republic of South 
Africa. 
69 Established in terms of the Defence Act and on file with the author. 
70 At this level, the package is not all-inclusive, meaning that it excludes benefits such as 
medical aid and housing allowance. These are difficult to quantify, suffice to say that 
the military offers the most generous medical benefits than any state department. The 
2016 housing allowance for public servants varied between R900 and R1 200 per 
month, depending on whether the employee was renting or not.  
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and experience, qualifications and performance. In contrast, an entry-level 
magistrate earns R835 444.71 Theoretically, this means that an entry-level 
magistrate could be earning two times more than an entry-level military judge 
depending on the experience of the military judge in question. As already argued, 
magistrates provide an appropriate comparator for military judges. To illustrate 
another possible scenario, a senior military judge with legal experience of between 
11 and 14 years earns between R612 744 and R743 604 (ML-4) per annum (all-
inclusive package) in comparison with the total remuneration package of R918 891 
earned by a senior magistrate.72 The salaries of military judges begin to compare 
very closely with those of magistrates in a situation where military judges have 
experience of between 16 and 30 years. Military judges in the latter category earn 
between R707 922 (minimum of ML-5) and R1 284 186 (maximum of ML-6). The 
author has not been able to establish how many of the twenty military judges are in 
the latter category at present (i.e. at the end of 2017). That said, even if there were 
to be a number of military judges in the higher remuneration bracket, the fact 
remains, that the current system does not guarantee adequate remuneration of all 
military judges. Adequate remuneration of judicial officers must be guaranteed and 
should not be left to chance. 
The remuneration of military judges described above is, in the view of this 
author, inadequate at lower to middle level (from three to ten years of 
experience).73 This is glaringly lower when compared with judicial officers of 
similar status in the civilian setting. In my view, the remuneration packages of 
magistrates could be seen as the national norm in terms of what judicial officers 
                                                 
71 See Proclamation No 327 of 17 March 2016 made in terms of s 12(1) the Magistrates’ Act 
90 of 1993. This amount is a total remuneration package, in other words, there are no 
benefits over and above that amount. The accuracy of the figures presented here may 
be disputed given the varied nature of the application of the OSD MLP and the PMC 
in relation to specific individuals. However, the range is generally accurate in terms of 
the OSD MLP and the PMC on file with the author. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Compare, however, the view by Nel, M Sentencing Practice in Military Courts (unpublished 
LLD thesis, Unisa 2012) at 202 that “the salaries and benefits of military judges are 
sufficiently protected and governed by legislation and policy documents”  (emphasis 
added), available at 
http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10500/5969/dissertation_nel_m.pdf?sequence=
1.While one accepts that there is legislation and policy dealing with salaries of 
military law officers in general, Nel does not pay sufficient attention to the ‘adequacy’ 
of remuneration as one of the crucial elements of financial security as stated by the 
Constitutional Court in Van Rooyen v The State op cit para 138. Nel compares military 
law officers with other ordinary military officers in the SANDF. Military judges 
should be compared with their peers in the civilian setting to ensure appropriate 
recognition of their status as judicial officers. 
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who occupy courts of similar status should earn, especially taking into account the 
considerations that are made in terms of legislation when making such 
determinations by the relevant structure. To compound the problem, military 
judges also do not enjoy security of tenure. The relevant legislation does not 
guarantee a period of appointment. It is common knowledge that, in the recent past, 
the appointment of military judges has ranged between one year (sometimes less) 
and two years. In some cases, appointments are renewed and in other cases, they 
are not or delayed significantly. In fact, at some point between 2015 and 2016 
some judges were not functioning for over a year because the Minister of Defence 
delayed renewing appointments of military judges. In one case, a military judge (Lt 
Col. O’Brien) raised serious concerns in a court judgment about the lack of tenure 
and how this could affect the independence of military judges. The following 
passage by the judge in question is instructive and worth reproducing: 
An aspect that the Court raised in respect of its concerns regarding the 
constitutionality of the assignment of military judges was the delay in the assignment 
of Military Judges in general (including that of the Military Judge) in these particular 
cases. The fact that for a period of 15 months (01 April 2015–30 May 2016), the 
Military Judge was not assigned could have a bearing on the outcome of whether 
there had been an unreasonable delay in the proceedings in terms of sec 342A CPA 
[Criminal Procedure Act No 51 of 1977]. It may, however, become more difficult to 
perform this function independently as required by the Constitution when one is not 
aware of the objective criteria required for an assignment as a Military Judge. It 
would seem that different criteria may be used to determine who is assigned or not 
assigned as a Military Judge. One year, it is court hours, another year, it is that you 
must be in possession of a secret security clearance and unfortunately there appears 
to be no semblance of transparency in respect of the recommendation and/or 
appointment process to be considered as a fit and proper person to serve as a 
Military Judge.74 
Although the above obiter remarks may attract a variety of views by those 
within the military or the military justice system for various reasons, the fact that 
they were expressed in this manner by a military judge in a court judgment 
illustrates unquestionably the nature of challenges faced by military judges in 
relation to judicial independence beyond the question of financial security raised in 
this article.  
                                                 
74 State v Corporal Mabula Case No OPS 83 (14/15), Staff Sergeant Mokoena Case No OPS 22 
(16/17) (2016) Court of Military Judge (Operations Support Legsato, Pretoria) para 12 
(on file with the author). Lack of security of tenure will not be expanded on in this 
article because this author has already addressed this issue in previous published 
research already referred to elsewhere in this article.  
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Can military judges be reasonably perceived as independent as things 
stand? Do military judges appear independent to a reasonable, well-informed, 
thoughtful and objective observer? It is my considered opinion that the answer is 
negative because a well-informed, thoughtful and objective observer will not 
perceive military judges as independent because military judges lack security of 
tenure, and are not, in the opinion of this author, adequately remunerated thereby 
lacking basic financial security as well. Let alone the question of institutional 
independence of military courts, which was not the subject of the study reflected 
here. Absence of objective guarantees of judicial independence, such as the ones 
identified in this article, does not require further evidence for an observer to 
conclude whether a court is independent. This is the approach, which is followed 
by the courts (including the Constitutional Court) in assessing whether a particular 
judicial body is independent.  
Inadequate remuneration opens up judges to influences such as 
corruption.75 It also affects their independence as individuals because the 
inadequacy of remuneration forces them to perform in a way that will get them to 
the next higher notch instead of focussing on administering justice as they see fit. I 
make this point because the advancement of military law officers (military judges 
included) to the next salary notch is dependent on their performance or promotion, 
which are decided based on certain expectations. Military judges can hardly be 
perceived to be independent in such conditions.  
It is suggested that the salaries of military judges should mirror those of 
magistrates. This means that, in line with the analysis of Tables C and D, salaries 
of military judges (CMJ) would reflect those of magistrates presiding over district 
magistrates’ courts, while those of senior military judges would mirror those of 
regional magistrates’ courts.76 The disparity between military judges at the lower 
levels and magistrates is significant, at least according to the figures considered in 
this article. The suggested level of remuneration would help ensure that military 
judges are financially secure, and that more outstanding officers are attracted and 
retained.  
Affordability is unlikely to be a big issue given that the size of the military 
judiciary is very small. As at 31 March 2004, there were only 19 full-time military 
                                                 
75 However, to date, the author is not aware of a single case of corruption involving military 
judges. 
76 It would be interesting to compare the earnings of individual senior military judges and their 
counterparts in the regional magistrates’ courts. Unfortunately, such information is not 
publicly available. 
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judges, four of whom were senior military judges.77 This number has hardly grown 
as there are now (i.e. 2017) only 20 military judges, five of whom are senior 
military judges. The cost of salaries of military judges is negligible when compared 
with the number of magistrates in South Africa. As at 31 March 2016, there were 2 
305 approved posts for magistrates.78 Of these, 1 893 were filled.79 Certainly, 
South Africa cannot fail to provide financial security to its military judges even if 
the matter is viewed from an unfavourable economic conditions perspective. 
Conclusion 
Judicial independence of military judges is essential in ensuring a fair and 
credible military justice system. Current arrangements regarding remuneration of 
military judges do not provide adequate financial security for military judges. 
Specifically, the remuneration of military judges is inadequate compared to their 
civilian counterparts (magistrates) who discharge similar judicial functions albeit in 
a different context. In South Africa, there are no special measures to guarantee the 
remuneration of military judges. There is an emerging trend among some countries 
on the cutting edge of military justice to establish special measures to deal with 
financial security of military judges. Military judges are increasingly and rightfully 
receiving special attention. Achieving an acceptable degree of judicial 
independence of any court of law requires political will and a fair level of 
commitment of resources. It is hoped that government will financially grant 
military judges the necessary recognition befitting judicial officers as it does in 
respect of all civilian judicial officers. 
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77 Presentation of the Military Legal Services Division (31 March 2004), available at 
www.pmg.org.za/docs/2004/appendices/040907services.ppt. 
78 Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, Annual Report (2015/2016) at 252 
http://www.justice.gov.za/reportfiles/anr2015-16.pdf. 
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